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Abstract 
 
The Dutch Civil Code stipulates that, for balanced gender representation, 30% of seats on the 
boards of large corporations should be occupied by women. If a company does not meet this 
requirement, the company is compelled to be transparent in its annual report by means of the 
‘comply or explain’ principle. This article analyses the application of this rule through content 
analysis of the annual reports of 52 listed companies in 2012 and 49 in 2013. The article 
discusses whether this rule has the desired effect of creating transparency on the gender quota. 
The conclusion is that ‘the comply or explain’ mechanism is inadequate without further 
measures, including sanctions. For 2012, 21% of the companies researched made no mention in 
their annual report of the application of the gender quota. In 2013, 18% of the companies made 
no mention of it. The companies that did indicate that they did not meet the quota failed to 
provide the required transparency. The reasons cited for not meeting the quota are nothing 
more than clichéd phrases, lacking any specificity. If the Netherlands wants to achieve the 
European and Dutch targets with the aid of the 'comply or explain' mechanism, the government 
will have to introduce additional mechanisms, including sanctions - or, alternatively, steer an 
entirely different course. 
 
Keywords: Gender Quota, ‘Comply Or Explain’ Principle, Board Of Directors, Transparency, Corporate 
Governance 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since 1 January 20131, to achieve gender balance in 
Dutch companies, 30% of seats on the boards of 
around 4,500 ‘large’ corporations should be 
occupied by women and 30% by men. If such an in 
the law specified company does not meet these 
quota, the company is compelled to be transparent 
in its annual report concerning why there is no 
gender balance, the attempts that have been made to 
rectify this and how it intends to achieve this in the 
future. This ties in with the wider European debate. 
The European Commission believes that the 
representation of men and women on boards of 
directors in the EU is not balanced. In early 2012, the 
European Commission indicated that just 13.7% of 
seats on the boards of the biggest listed companies 
were held by women and 15% of non-executive 
directors were female (EU Commission, 2012). The 
European Banking Authority collected in its recent 
report on the benchmarking of diversity practices 
data from 873 institutions from 29 countries. The 
conclusion is that the representation of women 
within the management body in 2016 is still (with 
13.63% in the management function and with 18.90% 
in the supervisory function) very low (EBA, 2016). 
At the end of 2012, the European Commission 
published a draft directive aimed at increasing the 
number of women on the boards of listed companies 
(COM (2012) 614 Final 4 November 2012). The 
Netherlands has made it known that it does not 
want any EU regulation in this sphere, particularly if 
                                                          
1 Under Art. 2:391 paragraph 7 of the Dutch Civil Code 
(DCC), in conjunction with Art. 2:166 and 276 DCC. 
it means imposing a fixed quota with attendant 
sanctions (Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 30 420, 
no. 172). However, a number of other EU Member 
States have chosen to embrace such quotas in their 
national legislation. In Norway, for instance, 
companies are dissolved if they fail to meet the 
requirements in this sphere. In France, the 
appointment of directors is void if the requirement 
is not met and payment of attendance fees is 
suspended  (Middelkoop and Van der Holst, 2003; 
Cremers-Hartman and Eleveld, 2014). Spanish 
companies are no longer eligible for public contracts 
or government subsidies if they have not met the 
quota. Furthermore, since 2016 Germany will 
introduce sanctions for companies that fail to 
observe the quota that applies there (Winter et al., 
2015).  
As explained in paragraph 2 below, the 
Netherlands does, on the face of it, satisfy the 
European requirements, having included a gender 
quota in Article 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC. However, no 
sanctions are imposed on companies that fail to 
meet the quota. In the Netherlands, transparency 
and the 'comply or explain' principle are used as 
mechanisms for achieving the desired percentages; if 
companies do not meet the quota, they must report 
on this in their annual report. This article analyses 
the content of annual reports to ascertain how listed 
companies have complied with this article of Dutch 
law. The study methods and results are presented in 
paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 respectively. Paragraph 
5 summarises the study and ends with the 
conclusion.  
For a good understanding of this research, I 
notice that this article does not analyse the gender 
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quota per se. The article analyses the correct 
application of Article 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC, 
discussing whether transparency on the gender 
quota has been achieved, is close at hand or is still a 
long shot. The European Commission has expressed 
in its proposal directive the expectation that, in 
2035, 40% of seats on the boards of directors of 
listed companies in the Netherlands will be occupied 
by women. Based on the annual reports, this study 
has undertaken an initial analysis of the 
expectations of the companies themselves regarding 
gender balance on their boards of directors and 
supervisory boards over the next few years. The 
conclusions of this study therefore help answer the 
question of whether the 'comply or explain' 
mechanism is sufficient without imposing further 
sanctions and, most importantly, whether the 
required transparency has been achieved. Moreover, 
a certain legal vacuum now exist, since the Dutch 
rule lapsed on 1 January 2016. At present, the 
incumbent cabinet is submitting a legislative 
proposal to extend the legislation until 1 January 
2020 (Parliamentary Papers II 2015/16, 30420, no. 
230) (Parliamentary Papers II 2015/16, 34435, no. 2 
and 4). It is therefore important to take stock of 
experiences so far before making further decisions 
on the future of the Dutch gender quota. 
 
2. TRANSPARENCY ON THE GENDER QUOTA 
THROUGH THE ‘COMPLY OR EXPLAIN’ 
PRINCIPLE 
 
With effect from 1 January 2013, the Netherlands 
introduced a gender quota for ‘large’ public and 
private limited companies (Art. 2:166 and 2:276 
Dutch Civil Code (DCC)) (Government Gazette, 2012). 
To ensure balanced representation on boards of 
directors (hereafter BoD) and supervisory boards 
(hereafter SB), at least 30% of the seats must be held 
by men and at least 30% by women. This rules 
applies to one-tier and two-tier companies. The 
reasons for choosing a quota of 30% are unclear, 
(Parliamentary Papers I 2010/11, 31763 C), but in 
order to be deemed a ‘large’ company, at least two of 
the following conditions must be met (Art. 2:397 
paragraph 1 DCC): 
a. the value of the assets on the balance sheet 
exceeds EUR 17,500,000 (based on cost of 
acquisition and manufacture); 
b. net turnover for the financial year exceeds 
EUR 35,000,000; 
c. the average number of employees over the 
financial year is greater than 250.2 
If a public limited company (hereafter N.V.) or 
private limited company (hereafter B.V.) has a seat 
on the board of another N.V. or B.V. which meets at 
least two of the above criteria, the 30% requirement 
also applies to that BoD and to the BoD of the 
parent, even if the latter do not meet the 
requirements themselves. Thus the applicability of 
the requirements is transmitted from subsidiary to 
parent. It is estimated that 4,500 companies satisfy 
these conditions (Middelkoop and Van der Holst, 
2013). If these 'large' companies do not abide by the 
quota, then Article 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC applies, 
                                                          
2 After the implementation of Directive 2013/34 / EU, the 
limits in Art. 2: 397 paragraph 1 DCC will be increased, 
Parliamentary Papers II 2014/15, 34 176, no. 2 
which contains a 'comply or explain' rule specifically 
for this 30% diversity percentage. If gender balance 
is not achieved, an explanation must be provided in 
the annual report as to: 
a. why there is no gender balance on the 
board; 
b. what attempts have been made to achieve 
balance; 
c. how the company intends to achieve this in 
the future. 
The Netherlands has chosen a 30% gender 
quota, with the additional mechanism of the 'comply 
or explain' principle. Why the legislature chose the 
percentage of 30, is not clarified in the 
parliamentary papers. Perhaps this mechanism was 
chosen to take account of sectors in which women 
are relatively poorly represented (Parliamentary 
Papers I 2010/11, 31763 C). The Netherlands does 
not impose any sanctions for failing to reach the 
quota or providing little or no explanation, other 
than that an interested party to this issue could set 
an annual procedure (Van Ginneken, 2012). Both in 
literature as well as in parliamentary papers 
criticism is visible (Houwerzijl, 2010; Middelkoop 
and Van der Holst, 2013). The rule is considered as a 
nice gesture, but doubt arise whether it will take 
effect. Moreover, the 'comply or explain' mechanism 
- and the limited duration of the rule - are somewhat 
odd (Van Ginneken, 2012). Because it is a so-called 
sunset clause, the rule lapsed on 1 January 2016 and 
the concerning companies are no longer obliged by 
law to provide explanation for failing to reach the 
quota of 30 percent (Parliamentary Papers II 
2009/10, 31763, no. 14). Taking the minimal growth 
in balanced gender representation in the boards into 
account, the incumbent cabinet believes in extending 
the rule. Therefore, the cabinet submitted a 
legislative proposal to extend the legislation until 1 
January 2020 (Parliamentary Papers II 2015/16, 
30420, no. 230) (Parliamentary Papers I 2010/11, 
31763, C, p. 25). The legislative proposal is currently 
pending for the Second Chamber of the Dutch 
parliament. In the spring of 2017 and subsequently 
2019 the situation will be reassessed and further 
decisions will be made (Parliamentary Papers II 
2015/16, 34435, no. 2 and 4) (Parliamentary Papers 
II 2014/2015, TK 86-8-1).  
In November 2012, the European Commission 
published a proposal for a Directive on improving 
the gender balance among non-executive directors of 
companies listed on stock exchanges (COM (2012) 
614 Final 4 November 2012). The self-regulation 
initiatives taken in many Member States have not, it 
has been noted, yielded clear change. On 1 March 
2011, the European Commission made another 
attempt to encourage self-regulation, by asking the 
Member States to sign a declaration of intent, but 
the results of this initiative were disappointing 
(Parliamentary Papers II 2012/13, 33483, no. 7). The 
European Commission has indicated in the proposal 
directive that, if things continue to progress at this 
pace, just eight Member States (including the 
Netherlands) will have achieved a percentage of 40% 
women among non-executive directors by 2035. 
Meanwhile, the national legislation that is now in 
place in this sphere has developed in various 
directions; some countries have a legally binding 
target with sanctions and the Netherlands has the 
'comply or explain' principle. In the explanatory 
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memorandum to its proposal for a directive, the 
European Commission argues that these divergent 
rules and developments pose barriers to the internal 
market for European listed companies, which is why 
it is advocating the rules in the proposed directive. 
Therefore, the European Commission proposes that 
Member States must ensure that 40% of the non-
executive directors at public listed companies are 
female with effect from January 2018; for other 
listed companies, the deadline is January 2020. 
There are some striking differences compared to the 
Dutch rules: the higher percentage (40% instead of 
30%) and the fact that only listed companies and 
only non-executive directors are affected (Cremers-
Hartman and Eleveld, 2014). The proposal has 
attracted a great deal of criticism and several 
Member States have made it known to the European 
Commission at various times that European 
regulation in this sphere is not welcomed. The 
Netherlands took the stance that diversity is chiefly 
the responsibility of the companies themselves and 
self-regulation accommodates the preferences and 
circumstances of the individual company 
(Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 30420, no. 172). 
Meanwhile, there is now a blocking minority that is 
against the proposal and negotiations regarding the 
directive are on hold for the time being, the file 
having been postponed (Parliamentary Papers II 
2012/13, 33483, no. 6). In the meantime, on 5 
December 2014 the EU Directive 2014/95 EU as 
regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information by certain large undertakings and 
groups came into force. This directive has to be 
implemented by the Netherlands before 16 
December 2016 and states that large undertakings 
which are public-interest entities exceeding the 
average number of 500 employees shall include in 
the management report a non-financial statement 
containing a description of the diversity policy 
applied. If no such policy is applied, the statement 
shall contain an explanation as to why this is the 
case.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLY AND RESULTS 
 
3.1 Research methodology 
 
The study population consists of all the companies 
seated in the Netherlands, listed in the Netherlands 
on the AEX, AMX or AScX, and with an annual report 
available for the years 2012 and 2013. Therefore, the 
study population consists of 52 companies for 2012 
and 49 companies for 2013. The study population is 
comprised as follows: 
 
Table 1. Composition of study population 
 
 AEX AMX AScX Total 
2012 17 19 16 52 
2013 15 18 16 49 
Total 32 37 32 101 
 
None of these companies met the gender quota 
in 2012 and 2013 and therefore all are required to 
explain their non-attainment of the 30% diversity 
quota pursuant to Art. 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC. The 
study was conducted by means of content analysis 
that is to be defined as a systematic, objective, 
quantitative analysis of message characteristics for 
making replicable inferences (Krippendorff, 2004). 
For each company, a questionnaire was completed 
based on the information provided by the companies 
in their annual report regarding non-attainment of 
the 30% requirement for diversity on the BoD and SB. 
The reasons indicated and the quality of the reasons 
for not achieving the 30% requirement were further 
categorised in the questionnaire.  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Mention of the legal clause 
 
Art. 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC unequivocally states 
that, if the BoD and/or SB of a (listed) company does 
not comprise at least 30% women (and men), the 
company must explain: 
a. why there is no gender balance on the 
board; 
b. what attempts have been made to achieve 
balance; 
c. how the company intends to achieve this in 
the future. 
In other words, if gender balance is not 
achieved (52 companies in 2012 and 49 in 2013), the 
'comply or explain' mechanism with respect to 
subparagraphs a-c must be used. In their annual 
report for 2012, 21% of the listed companies that 
had not achieved gender balance made no mention 
of the requirements placed on them by Art. 2:391 
paragraph 7 DCC; for 2013, that figure was 18% of 
companies (see figure 1). Despite the marginal 
improvement, we can conclude that 18% of listed 
companies are not complying with the mandatory 
article of law in 2013. The companies that did 
comply in principle (79% for 2012 and 82% for 2013) 
varied in the clarity of their explanations of the 
application of the requirements under Art. 2:391 
paragraph 7 DCC). The explanations they gave have 
been further categorised (see figure 1). 
Where there was explicit mention, the 
companies indicated that there was no gender 
balance on their BoD and/or SB and a clear response 
was provided to the questions in a-c. This is deemed 
good practice. 66% of the companies at which the 
BoD and/or the SB lacked gender balance applied 
this good practice in 2012, which increased to 72% in 
2013 (category I). The second category of companies 
(category II) implicitly referred to the requirements 
set by Art. 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC; with implicit 
mention, the reader is obliged to draw his or her 
own conclusions. In 2012 34% and in 2013 28% of 
the companies implicitly applied the requirements 
placed on them by Art. 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC. 
Comparing 2013 and 2012, there was a shift among 
the companies, from category II to categories I. They 
applied good practice - making explicit mention - 
more frequently. 
The mentions made by the companies - as 
indicated in figure 1 - are broken down further by 
organ (BoD or SB) and listing in table 2. Incidentally, 
various companies explicitly mentioned that one 
organ did not meet the quota while making an 
implicit mention for the other organ. 
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Figure 1. Mention of no gender balance in BO and/or SB 
 
 
 
Table 2. Mention of no gender balance in BoD and/or SB 
 
Year Type of mention Organ AScX % AMX % AEX % Total 
2012  
Explicit mention (good practice) 
BoD 7 27% 12 43% 7 27% 26 
SB 8 31% 13 46% 7 27% 28 
Total explicit 15 58% 25 89% 14 54% 54 
 
Implicit mention 
BoD 6 23% 2 7% 6 23% 14 
SB 5 19% 1 4% 6 23% 12 
Total implicit 11 42% 3 11% 12 46% 26 
 
Total 2012 26 100% 28 100% 26 100% 80 
2013 
Explicit mention (good practice) 
BoD 8 33% 12 40% 10 53% 30 
SB 7 29% 14 47% 3 16% 24 
Total explicit 15 63% 26 87% 13 68% 54 
 
Implicit mention 
BoD 4 17% 2 7% 2 11% 8 
SB 5 21% 2 7% 4 21% 11 
Total implicit 9 38% 4 13% 6 32% 19 
 
Total 2013 24 100% 30 100% 19 100% 73 
Explicit mention (good practice): Trend in 2013 compared 
with 2012 
 + 5%  -/- 2%  + 14%  
 
It is striking that far more AMX-listed 
companies employ good practice (89% in 2012 and 
87% in 2013) by explicitly disclosing how they meet 
the requirements of Art. 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC. 
The AEX-listed companies less widely employ good 
practice, although there was an improvement in 
2013 (68% make explicit mention) compared with 
2012 (54% make explicit mention). Lastly, the AScX-
listed companies score the lowest here: 58% 
employed good practice in 2012 and 63% in 2013. 
In this subparagraph, it was shown that 79% of 
the companies either comment on the application of 
Article 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC in their 2012 annual 
report and 82% in 2013, or use the 'comply or 
explain' principle in any manner and display 
transparency. On first sight these percentages may 
seem relatively high, but we analyse below whether 
this constitutes genuine transparency of content. 
 
4.2 Categories of explanations for non-attainment of 
the 30% diversity quota  
 
In their annual reports, the companies that are 
required to explain their non-attainment of the 30% 
diversity quota, gave diverging responses to the 
questions in a-c of Art. 2:391, paragraph 7 DCC. 
Does the annual report 
make mention of  no gender 
balance? 
No 
I: Explicit mention; 
BoD and/or SB yes diverse in 
terms of ♀ and ♂ 
II: Implicit mention; 
BoD and/or SB no diverse in 
terms of ♀ and ♂ 
2012:  
21% 
2013:  
18% 
Yes 
2012:  
79% 
2013:  
82% 
201  
66% 
2013:  
72% 
2012:  
34% 
2013:  
28% 
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These responses have been subdivided into 15 
categories. Table 3 shows the top 5 responses given 
by the listed companies to the three questions in 
Art. 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC for 2012 (a. why there is 
no gender balance on the board, b. what attempts 
have been made to achieve balance and c. how the 
company intends to achieve this in the future). 
 
Table 3. Explanations for non-attainment of the 30% diversity quota for 2012 (total) 
 
Organ Art. 2:391 
3 (No female 
candidate 
available) 
5 (Considers 
gender as one 
aspect of 
diversity) 
11 (Not 
investigated 
it) 
12 (Trying to 
take account of 
the clause) 
13 (No 
mention) 
Total 
BoD 
Subparagraph a 
(present) 
3 5 1 4 6 19 
Subparagraph b 
(past) 
4 4 1 3 7 19 
Subparagraph c 
(future) 
0 4 3 13 1 21 
Total 7 13 5 20 14 59 
SB 
Subparagraph a 
(present) 
5 8 1 1 6 21 
Subparagraph b 
(past) 
6 7 1 1 7 22 
Subparagraph c 
(future) 
0 5 3 10 2 20 
Total 11 20 5 12 15 63 
Both Total BoD  + SB 18 33 10 32 29 122* 
Top 5 4 1 5 2 3 
 
 
* 122 responses of a total of 162 responses to the questions in Art. 2:391, paragraph 7 (a-c) DCC 
 
The most common responses to the questions 
in Art. 2:391, paragraph 7 DCC that were given in 
annual reports for 2012 (see table 3) and which are 
therefore the top 5 are: 
- The company regards gender balance on the 
BoD and SB as one aspect of diversity and 
states that, in the past, present, and future it 
has devoted and will devote equal attention 
to a candidate’s gender, age and nationality 
(category 5; 33 times) (no. 1 of the top 5); 
- The company indicates that it has taken and 
will continue to take as much account as 
possible of the diversity clause (category 12; 
32 times) (no. 2 of the top 5); 
- The company makes no mention (category 
13; 29 times). Naturally, this means they 
have not met the requirements set by Art. 
2:391 paragraph 7 DCC (no. 3 of the top 5); 
- The company indicates that no woman was 
available (with the required qualities) 
(category 3; 18 times) (no. 4 of the top 5); 
- The company indicates that it has not yet 
investigated the effect of the provision at the 
company, or will do so (category 11; 10 
times) (no. 5 of the top 5). 
Table 4 shows the top 5 responses given by the 
listed companies to each question in Art. 2:391 
paragraph 7 DCC for 2013.  
 
Table 4. Explanations for non-attainment of the 30% diversity quota for 2013 (total) 
 
Organ Art. 2:391 
3 (No female 
candidate 
available) 
5 (Considers 
gender as one 
aspect of 
diversity) 
6 (Preference 
to female) 
12 (Trying to 
take account 
of the 
clause) 
13 (No 
mention) 
Total 
BoD 
Subparagraph a 
(present) 
6 1 2 5 4 18 
Subparagraph 
b (past) 
6 2 1 7 4 20 
Subparagraph c 
(future) 
0 1 2 14 4 21 
Total 12 4 5 26 12 59 
SB 
Subparagraph a 
(present) 
4 3 3 0 5 15 
Subparagraph 
b (past) 
5 4 2 0 5 16 
Subparagraph c 
(future) 
0 2 3 10 1 16 
Total 9 9 8 10 11 47 
Both Total BoD + SB 21 13 13 36 23 106* 
Top 5 3 4 5 1 2 
 
* 106 responses of a total of 162 responses to the questions in Art. 2:391, paragraph 7 (a-c) DCC 
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A new addition to the top 5 in 2013, replacing 
category 11 (Not investigated it) is category 6: 
- The company indicates that, if candidates 
are equally suitable, preference is given, or 
will be given to female candidates (category 
6; 13 times). This response was given four 
times as often by companies in 2013 
compared with the previous year (2012: 3 
times). 
Looking at both the years studied together, the 
explanation for category 12 (The company indicates 
that it has taken and will continue to take as much 
account as possible of the diversity clause) is the 
most common. Sadly, category 13 (The company 
makes no mention) was twice in the top 5 of 
responses given to the questions in Art. 2:391 
paragraph 7 (a-c). Also striking is that the response 
for category 11 (the company indicates that it has not 
yet investigated the effect of the provision at the 
company (subparagraph a/b), or will do so 
(subparagraph c) was given 10 times in 2012 and 
not at all in 2013. This leads to the conclusion that, 
in 2013, companies more frequently investigated the 
effect of Art. 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC at their 
company than in 2012, which is a positive 
development. 
 
4.3 Quality of the transparency 
 
In this subparagraph the quality of the explanations 
given by the listed companies is further reviewed. Or 
in other words, is the 'comply or explain' mechanism 
used in such a way that it is clear why the company 
does not reach the 30% diversity quota? As shown 
immediately below in table 5, the quality of the 
response given to the questions a-c of Art. 2:391 
paragraph 7 DCC has been divided into five 
categories:
 
Table 5. Quality of explanation in response to 2:391 paragraph 7 a-c 
 
Category Type of explanation 
A No explanation: The company gives no explanation for the discrepancy. 
B 
General: A general or non-specific (relating to the company) explanation has been given. Often, 
clichéd phrases have been used without any specific details. For example, the company has 
sought to comply with the provision (but not how). 
C Implementation: The company is working to implement the provision. 
D 
Limited: An explanation is given which provides more explanation than General, but still fails to 
be specific to the nature or circumstances of the company. 
E 
Specific: An explanation is given that is deemed specific within the meaning of the law. Such an 
explanation is geared specifically towards the company, substantiated, detailed and verifiable. 
 
The quality ranges from poor (A: ‘No 
explanation’) to good (E: ‘Specific’). As can be seen 
from figure 2 (for 2012) and figure 3 (for 2013), the 
majority of listed companies gave a general 
explanation in response to the questions in Art. 
2:391 paragraph 7 DCC (quality B). For 2012, this 
was true for 56% of the responses on average and an 
average of 53% of the responses for 2013. 
Furthermore, the companies regularly gave no 
explanation for one or more questions in the Article 
(quality A); in 2012, this was true for 19% of cases on 
average, reducing to an average of 14% of cases in 
2013. The companies were more inclined to give a 
response to the question in Art. 2:391 paragraph 
7(b) DCC in 2013 than in 2012; or how the company 
sought to achieve gender balance on the BoD and SB. 
In both years, only a few companies indicated that 
they were working to implement the clause (quality 
C; average 4% in 2012 and 1% in 2013). Quality C is 
to be expected more frequently, given the ‘novelty’ 
of the gender quota. 
 
Figure 2. Quality of the explanations (2012) 
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Figure 3. Quality of the explanations (2013) 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the number of times that a high-
quality response was given to the questions in Art. 
2:391 paragraph 7 DCC (quality D and E) has 
increased. For 2012, 10% of the responses given were 
deemed to be Quality D and 12% quality E. This rose 
to 15% and 17% for 2013. Although this is a positive 
development, it can be concluded that, for 2013, by 
far the majority of listed companies neglect to give a 
high-quality response to the questions they are 
required by law to answer in their annual report. 
 
4.4 Gaining acceptance of the statutory 
diversity clause 
 
To ascertain the level of support for the diversity 
requirement, the opinions given by the companies in 
their annual reports were subjected to further 
analysis. Roughly half of the listed companies (48% 
in 2012 and 49% in 2013) expressed an opinion on 
the clause. Those opinions have been assigned to 
three categories (see figure 4). For 2012, 40% of the 
companies took a positive view of efforts to achieve 
the 30% gender balance; this rose to 63% for 2013 
(category I). This group is therefore favourably 
disposed towards the statutory diversity clause. For 
2012, 28% of the companies indicated that they did 
not believe gender balance on the BoD and/or SB to 
be of decisive importance (category II). They 
indicated that they select their candidates on the 
basis of requirements other than gender. This 
percentage fell to 17% for 2013; as just described, 
more companies took a positive view in that year of 
efforts to achieve gender balance on the BoD and/or 
SB. Finally, in 2012 32% of the companies indicated 
that they regarded gender as one aspect of diversity, 
and that other requirements (such as age and 
nationality) are of equal importance (category III). In 
2013 this figure was 21%. The listed companies that 
can be placed in the last category (category III, see 
figure 4) rate gender as equally important as other 
forms of diversity. One should wonder if, in reality, 
these companies take a negative view of the 
requirement of Art. 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC, which 
focuses only on gender.  
 
Figure 4. Opinion on the statutory diversity clause 
 
 
Does the company 
express an opinion on the 
application of the article? 
No 
I: The company takes a  
positive view of efforts to  
achieve a 30% gender 
balance 
II: The company takes the 
view that efforts to achieve 
gender balance are not of 
crucial importance 
III: The company takes the 
view that efforts to achieve 
gender balance are 
important in terms of 
diversity, giving equal 
weight to the other  
requirements (e.g. age and nationality) 
2012:  
52% 
2013:  
51% 
Yes 
2012:  
48% 
2013:  
49% 
2012:  
40% 
2013:  
63% 
2012:  
28% 
2013:  
17% 
2012:  
32% 
2013:  
21% 
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4.5 Future expectations of the diversity quota 
 
Finally, I examined the future expectations about 
achieving the diversity targets. A small percentage of 
the listed companies (29% in 2012 and 16% in 2013) 
indicated whether they expected to meet the quota 
stated in Art. 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC in the future. 
These expectations have been divided into five 
categories (see figure 5). Category I comprises the 
companies that expected to meet the diversity quota 
set in Art. 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC the following year; 
in 2012 and 2013, this was true for 13% of the 
companies. Category II comprises the companies 
that did not expect to meet that quota the following 
year; in 2012, 7% of the companies belonged to this 
group and not a single company in 2013. Category III 
comprises the companies that expected to be closer 
to, or achieve the 30% gender quota in the future. In 
2012, this figure was 40% of the companies, rising to 
63% in 2013 - a positive trend. The fall in the 
number of companies placed in category IV was 
consistent with this; they did not expect to meet the 
diversity quota in the future (27% in 2012 and 13% in 
2013). Finally, category V comprises the companies 
that did not yet know whether they would comply 
with the clause in the future; this was 13% of the 
companies in both 2012 and 2013. 
 
Figure 5. Future expectations regarding compliance with the diversity clause 
 
 
 
It can be concluded that, compared with 2012, 
the listed companies outlined more positive 
expectations for the future in 2013 regarding gender 
balance in their BoD and SB. Nonetheless, some of 
the companies still explicitly stated the expectation 
that more than 70% of the seats on their BoD and/or 
SB would continue to be occupied by men in the 
future, as was currently the case. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Art. 2:391 paragraph 7 was included in the Dutch 
Civil Code with the aim of increasing the number of 
women on boards of directors and supervisory 
boards of large companies in the near future. The 
above paragraphs consider whether the 'comply or 
explain' mechanism is adequate for this purpose and 
whether the required transparency has been 
achieved. As already mentioned, the ‘sunset’ of the 
Dutch clause has been approached and it is 
therefore important to take stock of experiences so 
far. In the meantime, the Dutch Government 
submitted a legislative proposal to extend the legal 
basis of the diversity target rate of 30% 
(Parliamentary Papers II 2015/2016, 30420, No. 227). 
This study reveals that, of the 52 companies 
who do not meet the gender quota in 2012, 21% 
make no mention of this in their annual report. For 
2013, 18% of companies of the 49 listed companies 
studied made no mention of it. Moreover, the 
companies that did indicate that they did not meet 
the quota did not provide the required transparency 
with regard to the questions (i) why there is no 
gender balance on the boards, (ii) how has the 
company sought to achieve this and (iii) how does it 
intend to achieve it in the future. Common 
responses to the questions were that the company 
pays equal attention to candidates’ gender, age and 
nationality, as it regards gender as one aspect of 
diversity, that no woman with the required qualities 
was available and that the company has not yet 
investigated the effect of the clause at the company. 
The quality of the responses given was not 
high; more than half the companies gave only a 
general response to the questions. They used clichéd 
phrases without any specific details. Only a small - 
albeit growing - percentage provided a specific 
explanation in response to a question; a response 
that is geared specifically towards the company and 
is substantiated, detailed and verifiable. Despite 
these poor results, a substantial number of the 
Does the company 
express an expectation 
for the future regarding 
compliance? 
No 
I The company does expect 
to fulfil the clause the  
following year 
II The company does not 
expect to fulfil the clause  
the following year 
III The company expects to 
be closer to, or achieve the 
quota in the future 
IV The company does not 
expect to fulfil the clause 
in the future 
2012:  
71% 
2013:  
84% 
Yes 
2012:  
29% 
2013:  
16% 
2012:  
13% 
2013:  
13% 
2012:  
7% 
2013:  
0% 
2012:  
40% 
2013:  
63% 
2012:  
27% 
2013:  
13% 
V The company does not 
yet know whether it will 
fulfil the clause in the future 
2012:  
13% 
2013:  
13% 
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companies did declare themselves in favour of the 
substantive requirements of Art. 2:391 paragraph 7 
DCC. Those listed companies that took a negative 
view of the clause made it clear that they selected 
their candidates according to requirements other 
than gender. It is highly doubtful whether these 
companies will achieve the statutory percentage. A 
small minority of companies expressed future 
expectations regarding compliance. Those that did 
increasingly indicated that they expected to be 
closer to, or achieve the quota in the future. 
The article analyses the correct application of 
Article 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC, discussing whether 
transparency on the gender quota has been 
achieved, is close at hand or is still a long shot. The 
European Commission has expressed the 
expectation that, in 2035, 40% of the seats on the 
boards of directors of listed companies in the 
Netherlands will be occupied by women. The 
findings of this study present a different picture; 
few listed Dutch companies are properly complying 
with Art. 2:391 paragraph 7 DCC. The quota is not 
being met but, most importantly, the required 
transparency is lacking: the explanations are either 
absent or inadequate. If the Netherlands wants to 
achieve the European and Dutch targets with the aid 
of the 'comply or explain' mechanism, the 
government will have to introduce additional 
mechanisms, including sanctions - or, alternatively, 
steer an entirely different course. Simply extending 
the legislation until 1 January 2020 will not result in 
the necessary changes. Transparency is a huge asset 
and a powerful weapon but, in this instance, it has 
been found lacking. 
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